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Abstract
In the context of superintelligent AI systems, the term “oracle” has two meanings. One refers to modular
systems queried for domain-specific tasks. Another usage, referring to a class of systems which may be
useful for addressing the value alignment and AI control problems, is a superintelligent AI system that
only answers questions. The aim of this manuscript is to survey contemporary research problems related to
oracles which align with long-term research goals of AI safety. We examine existing question answering
systems and argue that their high degree of architectural heterogeneity makes them poor candidates for
rigorous analysis as oracles. On the other hand, we identify computer algebra systems (CASs) as being
primitive examples of domain-specific oracles for mathematics and argue that efforts to integrate computer
algebra systems with theorem provers, systems which have largely been developed independent of one
another, provide a concrete set of problems related to the notion of provable safety that has emerged in the AI
safety community. We review approaches to interfacing CASs with theorem provers, describe well-defined
architectural deficiencies that have been identified with CASs, and suggest possible lines of research and
practical software projects for scientists interested in AI safety.
I. Introduction
Recently, significant public attention has been
drawn to the consequences of achieving human-
level artificial intelligence. While there have
been small communities analyzing the long-term
impact of AI and related technologies for decades,
these forecasts were made before the many recent
breakthroughs that have dramatically accelerated
the pace of research in areas as diverse as robotics,
computer vision, and autonomous vehicles, to
name just a few [1, 2, 3].
Most researchers and industrialists view
advances in artificial intelligence as having
the potential to be overwhelmingly beneficial
to humanity. Medicine, transportation, and
fundamental scientific research are just some
of the areas that are actively being transformed
by advances in artificial intelligence. On the
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other hand, issues of privacy and surveillance,
access and inequality, or economics and policy are
also of utmost importance and are distinct from
the specific technical challenges posed by most
cutting-edge research problems [4, 5].
In the context of AI forecasting, one set of issues
stands apart, namely, the consequences of artificial
intelligence whose capacities vastly exceed that of
human beings. Some researchers have argued that
such a “superintelligence” poses distinct problems
from the more modest AI systems described
above. In particular, the emerging discipline of
AI safety has focused on issues related to the
potential consequences of mis-specifying goal
structures for AI systems which have significant
capacity to exert influence on the world. From this
vantage point, the fundamental concern is that
deviations from “human compatible values” in
a superintelligent agent could have significantly
detrimental consequences [1].
One strategy that has been advocated for
addressing safety concerns related to superin-
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telligence is Oracle AI, that is, an AI system
that only answers questions. In other words, an
Oracle AI does not directly influence the world
in any capacity except via the user of the system.
Because an Oracle AI cannot directly take physical
action except by answering questions posed by
the system’s operator, some have argued that it
may provide a way to bypass the immediate need
for solving the “value alignment problem” and
would itself be a powerful resource in enabling
the safe design of autonomous, deliberative
superintelligent agents [6, 1, 7, 8].
A weaker notion of the term oracle, what we call
a domain-specific oracle, refers to a modular com-
ponent of a larger AI system that is queried for
domain-specific tasks. In this article, we view com-
puter algebra systems as primitive domain-specific
oracles for mathematical computation which are
likely to become quite powerful on the time hori-
zons on which many expect superintelligent AI sys-
tems to be developed [9, 10]. Under the assumption
that math oracles prove to be useful in the long-
term development of AI systems, addressing well-
defined architectural problemswith CASs and their
integration with interactive theorem provers pro-
vides a concrete set of research problems that align
with long-term issues in AI safety. In Section II,
we briefly discuss the unique challenges in allocat-
ing resources for AI safety research. In Section III
we analyze contemporary question answering sys-
tems and argue that in contrast to computer algebra
systems, current consumer-oriented, NLP-based
systems are poor candidates for rigorous analysis
as oracles. We then give a brief overview of the
history and use cases of computer algebra as well
as an overview of safety risks and control strate-
gies which have been identified in the context of
superintelligent oracle AIs. In Section IV, we re-
view the differences between theorem provers and
computer algebra systems, efforts at integrating the
two, and known architectural problems with CASs.
We close with a list of additional research projects
related to mathematical computation which may
be of interest to scientists conducting research in AI
safety.
II. Metascience of AI Safety Research
From a resource allocation standpoint, AI safety
poses a unique set of challenges. Few areas of
academic research operate on such long and
potentially uncertain time horizons. This is not to
say that academia does not engage in long-term
research. Research in quantum gravity, for
example, is approaching nearly a century’s worth
of effort in theoretical physics [11]. However, the
key difference between open-ended, fundamental
research in the sciences or humanities and AI
safety is the possibility of negative consequences,
indeed significant ones, of key technological
breakthroughs taking place without corresponding
advances in frameworks for safety [1, 12] .
These issues have been controversial, largely
due to disagreement over the time-horizons for
achieving human-level AI and the subsequent
consequences [9, 10]. Specifically, the notion of an
“intelligence explosion,” whereby the intelligence
of software systems dramatically increases due
their capacity to model and re-write their own
source code, has yet to receive adequate scientific
scrutiny and analysis [13].
We affirm the importance of AI safety research
and also agree with those who have cautioned
against proceeding down speculative lines of
thinking that lack precision. Our perspective in
this article is that it is possible to fruitfully discuss
long-term issues related to AI safety while main-
taining a connection to practical research problems.
To some extent, our goal is similar in spirit to the
widely discussed manuscript “Concrete Problems
in AI Safety” [14]. However, we aim to be a
bit more bold. While the authors of “Concrete
Problems” state at the outset that their analysis
will set aside questions related to superintelligence,
our goal is to explicitly tackle superintelligence
related safety concerns. We believe that there are
areas of contemporary research that overlap with
novel ideas and concepts that have arisen among
researchers who have purely focused on analyzing
the consequences of AI systems whose capacities
vastly exceed those of human beings.
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To be clear, we do not claim that the strategy
of searching for pre-existing research objectives
that align with the aims of superintelligence
theory is sufficient to cover the full spectrum of
issues identified by AI safety researchers. There
is no doubt that the prospect of superintelligence
raises entirely new issues that have no context in
contemporary research. However, considering how
young the field is, we believe that the perspective
adopted in this article is a down-to-earth and
moderate stance to take while the field is in a criti-
cal growth phase and a new culture is being created.
This article focuses on one area of the AI safety
landscape, Oracle AI. We identify a set of concrete
software projects that relate to more abstract, con-
ceptual ideas from AI safety, to bridge the gap
between practical contemporary challenges and
longer term concerns which are of an uncertain
time horizon. We state at the outset that within
the context of Oracle AI, our analysis is limited in
scope to systems which performmathematical com-
putation, and not to oracles in general. Nonetheless,
considering how little effort has been directed at the
superintelligence control problem, we are confident
that there is low-hanging fruit in addressing these
more general issues which are awaiting discovery.
III. Are there contemporary systems
which qualify as oracles?
The obvious class of contemporary systems which
would seem to qualify as oracles are question
answering systems (QASs). As we stated above, a
basic criterion characterizing oracles is that their
fundamental mode of interaction is answering
questions posed by a user, or for domain-specific
queries as part of a larger AI system.
Contemporary QASs are largely aimed at
using natural language processing techniques
to answer questions pertaining to useful facts
about the world such as places, movies, historical
figures, and so on. An important point to make
about QASs is the highly variable nature of the
underlying technology. For instance, IBM’s original
Watson system which competed in Jeopardy, was
developed prior to the recent advances in deep
learning which have fundamentally transformed
areas ranging from computer vision, to speech
recognition, to natural language processing [15].
In this particular task, the system was nonetheless
able to perform at a level beyond that of the
most accomplished human participants. The
introduction of “info panes” into popular search
engines, on the other hand, have been based on
more recent machine learning technology, and
indeed, these advances are also what power
the latest iterations of the Watson system [16].
On the other end of the spectrum is Wolfram |
Alpha, which is also a question answering system,
but which is architecturally centered around a
large, curated repository of structured data, rather
than datasets of unstructured natural language [17].
While these systems are currently useful for
humans in navigating the world, planning social
outings, and arriving at quick and useful answers
to ordinary questions, it is not clear that they will
remain useful in quite the same capacity many
years from now, or as standalone components
of superintelligent AI systems. Although the
underlying techniques of deep learning or NLP
are of fundamental interest in their own right, the
fact that these systems are QASs at all seems to be
more of an artifact of their utility for consumers.
Another important observation about contempo-
rary QASs is that much of their underlying NLP-
based architecture can be replaced by taking ad-
vantage of structured data. Indeed, the architec-
ture of Wolfram | Alpha is entirely build around a
large repository of curated data, anddoes not utilize
statistical techniques in the process of information
retrieval. For the other NLP or machine learning
based systems, the underlying technology can be
used as part of larger, semi-automated pipelines to
turn unstructured data from textual sources into
structured data. Once again, this fact simply under-
scores that contemporary QASs are not particularly
appealing model systems to analyze from the Ora-
cle AI safety perspective.1
1There are certainly important problems to examine when
evaluating the broader impact of QASs, such as bias in NLP sys-
tems, overgeneralization, and privacy, to name just a few. Some
of these issues overlap with the set of problems identified in [14]
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III.1. Computer Algebra and Domain-
Specific Oracles
The question answering systems described above
all rely on natural language processing to varying
degrees. In addition, their domain of applicabil-
ity has tended towards “ordinary” day-to-day
knowledge useful to a wide array of consumers.
Another type of question answering system is
a computer algebra system (CAS). Computer
algebra has traditionally referred to systems for
computing specific results to specific mathematical
equations, for example, computing derivatives
and integrals, group theoretic quantities, etc. In
a sense, we can think of computer algebra as a
set of algorithms for performing what an applied
mathematician or theoretical physicist might work
out on paper and pencil. Indeed, some of the early
work in computer algebra came from quantum
field theory—one of the first computer algebra
systems was Veltman’s Schoonschip for performing
field theoretic computations that led to the theory
of electroweak unification [18].
As computer algebra systems have grown
in popularity, their functionality has expanded
substantially to cover a wide range of standard
computations in mathematics and theoretical
physics, including differentiation, integration,
matrix operations, manipulation of symbolic
expressions, symbolic substitution, algebraic
equation solving, limit computation, and many
others. Computer algebra systems typically
run in a read, evaluate, print loop (repl),
and in the research and education context, their
popularity has also grown as a result of the
notebook model pioneered by the Mathematica
system, allowing for computations in CASs to
closely mimic the sequential, paper and pencil
work of mathematicians and theoretical physicists.
In assessing the long-term utility of CASs, it
is important to note that there is little reason to
believe that computer algebra will be subsumed
by other branches of AI research such as machine
as examples of concrete problems in AI safety, and in addition,
we are beginning to see conferences devoted to contemporary
ethical issues raised by machine learning. See, for example, the
workshop Ethics in Natural Language Processing.
learning. Indeed, recent research has demonstrated
applications of machine learning to both computer
algebra and theorem proving (which we discuss in
more detail below), via algorithm selection in the
former case [19] and proof assistance in the latter
[20, 21]. While certainly not as visible as machine
learning, computer algebra and theorem proving
are very much active and deep areas of research
which are also likely to profit from advances in
other fields of artificial intelligence, as opposed to
being replaced by them [22]. On the time horizons
on which we are likely to see human-level artificial
intelligence and beyond, we can expect that these
systems will become quite powerful, and possess
capabilities that may be useful in the construction
of more general AI systems. Therefore, it is worth
examining such systems from the perspective of AI
safety.
III.2. Safety Challenges of Oracle AI
There is a clear difference between usage of the
word oracle in the sense of amodular part of a larger
AI system, and a standalone, superintelligent oracle
AI. In particular, AI safety researchers have argued
that superintelligent oracles have the potential to
help address safety concerns of autonomous, de-
liberative superintelligent AI systems, as an Oracle
AI’s only ability to influence the world is through
the user of the system. Consequently, an Oracle AI
itself may be in a position to assist researchers in
solving difficult technical and conceptual problems
related to the design of independent, deliberative
agents. Yet superintelligent oracle AIs pose their
own distinct set of safety concerns. The problems
identified in [6], for example, presume a superintel-
ligent AI system, which while limited in its ability
to interact with the world, may nonetheless have
the potential to negatively impact the world by ma-
nipulating the user of the system. As Armstrong,
Bostrom, and Sandberg write:
We are all vulnerable to the OAI’s social en-
gineering. An advanced OAI can literally of-
fer us the world. Genuine altruism is no de-
fence against this; it can offer a world free of
poverty, hunger, war, disease or death, as well
as all personal trinketswe couldwant. It could
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guess the weaknesses of each individual, and
find the right arguments to convince us that
granting it power or liberty is the moral and
profitable thing to do. It will be able to play
on rivalries, institutional weaknesses and eth-
ical dilemmas with more virtuosity than any
human could. [6]
Given the potential dangers of human manip-
ulation by an OAI, researchers have searched for
control strategies to mitigate such risks. A few ex-
amples of control methods that have been proposed
are:
• Physical security- physically containing the
OAI system
• Limiting or eliminating external manipula-
tors- like the previous security measure, pre-
cluding the OAI from physically manipulating
the world in any direct manner
• Epistemic capability control- the OAIs out-
put could be restricted even further beyond
question answering, for example, restricting it
to answer “yes / no ” questions
• Virtual worlds- the OAI could be run in a sim-
ulated world so that even if the system’s capa-
bilities were expanded, its behavior could be
observed and modeled.
• Resetting the OAI after each question- this
would prevent the OAI from engaging in long-
term social engineering by manipulating the
answers to the users’ questions
Although the capacities of domain-specific
oracles are more limited, they can nonetheless
pose safety risks. Architectural deficiencies in such
oracles might be exploited by a larger AI system
to manipulate the human user. For instance, a
superintelligent OAI could use systematic errors in
computer algebra (which we discuss in more detail
below), to skillfully misdirect a user by giving false
answers to mathematical or scientific queries. It
could give answers which are difficult to verify
and which allow the OAI to execute complex and
intricate plans unbeknownst to the user. Therefore,
while flaws in domain-specific oracles are not
inherently risky if used solely in their domain of
applicability, they may very well be dangerous
as part of a larger system with more general
capabilities. Though not a “control strategy” in the
narrowest sense, creating “robust” domain-specific
oracles is an important objective in designing safe
OAIs. Furthermore, ensuring the robustness of
domain-specific subsystems might mitigate the
need for stronger control strategies, as the OAI
would have fewer weaknesses to exploit.
It should go without saying that the arguments
presented above are highly schematic and do not
dependent on specific technologies. To our knowl-
edge, there is very limited work on translating anal-
yses of superintelligent oracle AIs into the concrete
language of modern artificial intelligence [23, 8].
Our goal in this manuscript is in this spirit, that is,
to anchor schematic, philosophical arguments in
practical, contemporary research. To do so, we will
narrow our focus to the mathematical domain. In
the remainder of the article, we will use the term or-
acle in the more limited sense of a domain-specific
subsystem, and in particular, oracles for perform-
ing mathematical computations. We hope that the
analysis presented here will be of intrinsic value in
developing robust math oracles, as well as provide
some intuition and context for identifying concrete
problems relevant to developing safe, superintelli-
gent oracle AI systems.
III.3. Briefly Clarifying Nomenclature
Before proceeding, we want to explicitly describe
issues relating to nomenclature that have arisen in
the discussion thus far, and state our choices for
terminology. Given that the phrase “Oracle AI” has
become common usage in the AI safety community,
we will continue to use this phrase, with the first
word capitalized, as well as the acronym OAI.
Where clarification is needed, we may also use the
full phrase “superintelligent oracle AI,” without
capitalization.
For more modest use cases of the word oracle,
we will either refer to “domain-specific oracles,” or
state the domain of knowledge where the oracle
is applicable. We can, at the very least in the ab-
stract, consider extending this terminology to other
domains such as “physics oracles,” “cell biology
oracles,” or “ethics oracles” and so on. Therefore,
the remainder of the article will be concerned with
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safety and robustness issues in the design of “math
oracles.”
IV. Robust Computer Algebra and
Integrated Theorem Proving
Today we should consider as a standard feature
much closer interaction between proof assistance
and computer algebra software. Several areas can
benefit from this, including specification of inter-
faces among components, certification of results
and domains of applicability, justification of opti-
mizations and, in the other direction, use of efficient
algebra in proofs.
- Stephen Watt in On the future of computer
algebra systems at the threshold of 2010
As we described above, computer algebra
systems can be thought of as question answering
systems for a subset of mathematics. A related
set of systems are interactive proof assistants or
interactive theorem provers (ITPs). While ITPs are
also systems for computer-assisted mathematics,
it is for a different mathematical context, for
computations in which one wishes to construct
a proof of a general kind of statement. In other
words, rather than computing specific answers
to specific questions, ITPs are used to show that
candidate mathematical structures (or software
systems) possess certain properties.
In a sense, the distinction between theorem
proving and computer algebra should be viewed
as a historical anomaly. From the perspective
of philosophical and logical efforts in the early
20th century that led to the “mechanization of
mathematics” the distinction between computing
the nth Laguerre polynomial and constructing
a proof by induction might have been viewed
as rather artificial, although with the benefit of
hindsight we can see that the two types of tasks are
quite different in practice [24].
The role of ITPs in the research world is very
different from that of CASs. Whereas CASs allow
researchers to perform difficult computations
that would be impossible with paper and pencil,
constructing proofs using ITPs is often more
difficult than even the most rigorous methods
of pure mathematics. In broad terms, the over-
head of using ITPs to formalize theorems arises
from the fact that proofs in these systems must
proceed strictly from a set of formalized axioms
so that the system can verify each computation.
Consequently, ITPs (and related systems, such
as automatic theorem provers) are largely used
for verifying properties of mission-critical soft-
ware systems which require a high-degree of
assurance, or for hardware verification, where
mistakes can lead to costly recalls [25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
As the quotation above suggests, many academic
researchers view the integration of interactive
proof assistants and computer algebra systems as
desirable, and there have been numerous efforts
over the years at exploring possible avenues for
achieving this objective [30, 31, 32, 33] (a more
complete list is given below). By integrating
theorem proving with computer algebra, we would
be opening up a wealth of potentially interoperable
algorithms that have to date remained largely
unintegrated. To cite one such example, in [34], the
authors have developed a framework for exchange
of information between the Maple computer
algebra system and the Isabelle interactive theorem
prover. They show a simple problem involving the
proof of an elementary polynomial identity that
could be solved with the combined system, but in
neither system alone (see Fig. 1).
We cite this example to demonstrate how a
simply stated elementary problem cannot be solved
in existing environments for either computer
algebra or proof assistance. The computer algebra
system does not have the capacity for structural in-
duction and theorem provers generally have rather
weak expression simplifiers. There are numerous
examples such as this one in the academic literature.
Another key difference between CASs and ITPs
is the architectural soundness of the respective sys-
tems. As we will discuss below, computer algebra
systems have well-defined architectural deficien-
cies, which while not a practical issue for the vast
majority of use cases, pose problems for their inte-
gration with theorem provers, which by their na-
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Specification and Integration of Theorem Provers 105
Maple calls. In concrete, this is performed by simplification via the evalua-
tion rules.
4. Finally, by a repeated use of the laws which governate disequalities between
products and sums, the induction step is proved. In this phase, additional
Maple calls are used to verify disequalities between ground values, e.g. 2  5.
The compound OMSCS tactic that originates the proof in our formalization
closely resembles the series of Isabelle’s tactics invocations used in [10] to achieve
the result. Its execution results in a (flat) symbolic mathematical structure which
represents the proof of the conjecture. The following picture provides a simplified
presentation of the structure.
2 3
5
INDUCT
4
SIMPLIFY
MAPLE SIMPLIFY
6
7 8
MAPLE
REST
1
ASSUMEREFL
1 : TH `I n5  5n
2 : TH `I 55  55
3 : TH `I n  5
4 : TH `I 8x : [x 2 N ^ 5  x ^ x5  5x] =) (x+ 1)5  5(x+1)
5 : x 2 N `M (x+ 1)5 ⌘ x5 + 5x4 + 10x3 + 10x2 + 5x+ 1
6 : TH `I 8x : [x 2 N ^ 5  x ^ x5  5x] =)
x5 + 5x4 + 10x3 + 10x2 + 5x+ 1  5(x+1)
7 : x 2 N `M 5(x+1) ⌘ 5 ⇤ 5x
8 : TH `I 8x : [x 2 N ^ 5  x ^ x5  5x] =)
x5 + 5x4 + 10x3 + 10x2 + 5x+ 1  5 ⇤ 5x
Circles represent object nodes, whose labels are reported in the table; rectangles
represent link nodes, and contain their labels. The complex series of steps cor-
responding to the final phase of the proof are folded within the triangular REST
node. Link nodes labelled with SIMPLIFY identify the points where the systems
cooperate to the solution of the problem; namely, where Maple is invoked to ex-
pand some polynomial power. Note that the REST folded node hides away several
additional Maple calls, meant to perform evaluations of disequalitites.
Figure 1: Example of a polynomial identity proven by integrating the Maple computer algebra system with Isabelle. Maple’s
simplifier is used for expanding polynomials—a powerful complement to the theorem proving architecture of Isabelle
which allows for the setup of a proof by induction.
ture, are designed to be architecturally sound. In
the context of superintelligent AI systems, the ar-
chitectural problems of CASs are potential points
of weakness that could be exploited for malicious
purposes. Therefore, we use the phrase “robust
computer algebra” to refer to CASs which lack the
problems that have been identified in the research
literature. In the section below, we combine the
discussion of robust computer algebra and integra-
tion with interactive theorem provers, as there is
a spectrum of approaches which address both of
these issues to varying degrees.
IV.1. A Taxonomy of Approaches
There are many possible avenues to tackle the inte-
gration of theorem provers with computer algebra
systems. We give 4 broad categories characterizing
such integration efforts2:
1. Theoremprovers built on top of computer al-
gebra systems: These include Analytica, The-
orema, RedLog, and logical extensions to the
Axiom system [35, 33, 36, 37, 38] .
2. Frameworks for mathematical exchange be-
tween the two systems: This category in-
2This classification was first described by Kaliszyk and
Wiedijk [31] in a paper arguing for an architecture which we list
as the fourth category given above.
cludes MathML, OpenMath, OMSCS, Math-
Scheme, and Logic Broker [39, 40, 41, 42, 43].
3. “Bridges” or “ad-hoc” information exchange
solutions: The pairs of systems in this cate-
gory include bridges combining PVS, HOL,
or Isabelle with Maple, NuPRL with Weyl,
Omega with Maple/GAP, Isabelle with Sum-
mit, and most recently, Lean with Mathematica
[34, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50]. The example
given above, bridging Isabelle and Maple, is
an example of an approach from this category.
4. Embedding a computer algebra system in-
side a proof assistant: This is the approach
taken by Kaliszyk and Wiedijk in the HOL-
CAS system. In their system, all expressions
have precise semantics, and the proof assistant
proves the correctness of each simplification
made by the computer algebra system [31].
One primary aspect of integration that differen-
tiates these approaches is the degree of trust the
theorem prover places in the computer algebra sys-
tem. Computer algebra systems give the false im-
pression of being monolithic systems with globally
well-defined semantics. In reality, they are large col-
lections of algorithms which are neatly packaged
into a unified interface. Consequently, there are
often corner cases where the lack of precise seman-
tics can lead to erroneous solutions. Consider the
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following example:
Figure 2: Example of an incorrect solution to a simple polyno-
mial equation by a computer algebra system.
The system incorrectly gives 1 as a solution,
even though the given polynomial has an inde-
terminate value for x = 1. However, because
the expression is treated as a fraction of poly-
nomials, it is first simplified before the solve
operation is applied. In other words, there is an
unclear semantics between the solver module
and the simplifier which leads to an incorrect result.
Another simple example is the following integral:
Figure 3: A problem arising in symbolic integration due to the
non-commutativity of evaluation and substitution.
Making the substitution n = −1 gives an inde-
terminate result, while it is clear by inspection that
the solution to the integral for n = −1 is simply
ln(x). This belongs to a class of problems known
as the specialization problem, namely that expression
evaluation and variable substitution do not com-
mute [30]. So while we have seen above that the-
orem proving can benefit tremendously from the
wealth of algorithms for expression simplification
and mathematical knowledge in computer algebra,
there is the potential cost of compromising the reli-
ability of the combined system.
IV.1.1 Qualitatively Certified Computations
In our taxonomy of approaches to bridging theo-
rem provers with computer algebra, we described
how a key distinction was the degree of trust that
the theorem prover places in the computer algebra
system. For instance, approaches which build theo-
rem provers on top of computer algebra systems
do not address the architectural issues with CASs.
They are integrative, but not more sound. On the
other extreme, building a computer algebra system
on top of a theorem prover allows for a degree
of trust that is on par with that of the theorem
prover itself. However, this approach has the dis-
tinct disadvantage that computer algebra systems
represent many hundredman-years worth of effort.
The more intermediate approaches involving
common languages for symbolic exchange or
ad-hoc bridges, bring to light an important notion
in the spectrum of provable safety, namely the
ability to assign probabilities for the correctness of
computations. In [51], the authors present an algo-
rithm for assigning probabilities to any statement
in a formal language. We might ask what strategies
might look like that have a similar goal in mind,
but are significantly weaker. Interfaces between
theorem provers and computer algebra systems
provide a concrete example where we can ask a
question along these lines. Fundamentally, in such
an interface, the computer algebra system is the
weaker link and should decrease our confidence in
the final result. But by how much? For instance,
in the example given in Figure 1, how should we
revise our confidence in the result knowing that
polynomial simplification was conducted within a
computer algebra system?
It is worth asking for simple answers to this
question that do not require major theoretical
advances to be made. For instance, we might
imagine curating information from computer
algebra experts about known weaknesses, and use
this information to simply give a qualitative degree
of confidence in a given result. Or, for example,
in a repository of formal proofs generated using
integrated systems, steps of the proof that require
computer algebra can be flagged and also assigned
a qualitative measure of uncertainty.
8
Robust Computer Algebra, Theorem Proving, and Oracle AI
The relationship that this highly informal
method of giving qualitative certification to
computations has with the formal algorithm
developed in [51] can be compared to existing
techniques in the software industry for ensuring
correctness. On the one hand, unit testing is a
theoretically trivial, yet quite powerful practice,
something along the lines of automated checklists
for software. The complexities of modern software
would be impossible to handle without extensive
software testing frameworks [52, 53, 54, 55, 56]. On
the other hand, formal verification can provide
substantially stronger guarantees, yet is a major
undertaking, and the correctness proofs are often
significantly more demanding to construct than
the software itself. Consequently, as discussed
in Section IV, formal verification is much less
frequently used in industry, typically only in
exceptional circumstances where high guarantees
of correctness are required, or for hardware
verification [25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
Integrated systems for computer algebra and the-
orem proving give rise to a quite interesting (and
perhaps ironic) opportunity to pursue simple strate-
gies for giving qualitative estimates for the correct-
ness of a computation.
IV.1.2 Logical Failures and Error Propagation
The decision-theoretic research agenda for the
development of safe, superintelligent AI systems
outlined in [57, 58, 59, 60, 61] is predicated on
formal guarantees of correctness at every step of
an AI system’s computation. This means that if a
logical error were to arise in a sequence of compu-
tations, the computation would simply terminate
or crash the system. However, in a computer
algebra system, as the examples described above
demonstrate, errors in initial calculations may very
well propagate and simply give rise to non-sensical
results. In the case of a superintelligent AI system,
a more concerning scenario would be if systematic
errors in computer algebra could be exploited for
malicious purposes.
The issue of error propagation is another exam-
ple of a concrete context for pursuing simple strate-
gies for assigning qualitative measures of certainty
to computations performed by integrated theorem
proving / computer algebra systems. For instance,
wemay be less inclined to trust a result in which the
computer algebra system was invoked early on in a
computation as opposed to later. With curated data
from computer algebra experts on the reliability or
failure modes of various algorithms, we might also
chain together these informal estimates to arrive
at a single global qualitative estimate. If multiple
systems were to be developed independently, or
which were based on fundamentally different ar-
chitectures, we might also be significantly more
confident in a result which could be verified by two
separate systems.
IV.1.3 Additional Topics
Some related ideas merit investigation in the
broader context of mathematical computation:
• Integrating SMT solvers with interactive
theorem provers: Satisfiability modulo
theories (SMT) solvers are an important
element of automated reasoning and there
have been efforts analogous to those described
above to bridge SMT solvers with interactive
theorem provers [62, 63].
• Identifying the most important / widely
used algorithms in computer algebra: Com-
puter algebra systems have grown to become
massive collections of algorithms extending
into domains well outside of the realm of
mathematics. If the purely mathematical
capacities of CASs prove to be useful in future
AI systems, it would be valuable to rank order
algorithms by their popularity or importance.
One approach would be to do basic textual
analysis of the source code from GitHub or
StackExchange. This would also allow for
more targeted efforts to directly address the
issues with soundness in core algorithms such
as expression simplification or integration. In
the context of the HOLCAS system described
above, for example, it would be valuable
to have rough estimates for the number of
9
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man-hours required to implement a minimal
CAS with the most widely used functionality
on top of a theorem prover.
• Proof checkers for integrated systems: Proof
checkers are important tools in the landscape
of formal verification and theorem proving.
Indeed, as it is often much less computation-
ally expensive to verify the correctness of a
proof than to generate it from scratch, the
availability of proof checkers for the widely
used interactive theorem provers is one reason
we can be confident in the correctness of
formal proofs [64, 65].
As we described above, strategies for integrat-
ing computer algebra with theorem provers
can potentially result in a combined system
which is less trustworthy than the theorem
prover alone. Therefore, the availability of
proof checkers for combined systems would
be a valuable resource in verifying proof
correctness, and in certain mathematical
domains, potentially provide an avenue for
surmounting the need to directly make the
CAS itself more architecturally robust.
The development of integrated proof checkers
is likely to be a substantial undertaking and
require novel architectures for integrating the
core CAS and ITP systems distinct from what
has been described above. However, it is a
largely unexplored topic that merits further
investigation.
• Analyzing scaling properties of algorithms
for computer algebra and theorem proving
as a function of hardware resources: The
premise of the analysis presented above is
that CASs (and integrated theorem proving)
are likely to remain sufficiently architecturally
stable and useful on a several decade time-
horizon in the construction of AI systems.
On the other hand, as we argued earlier, it
is much less clear that the same will be true
of the most visible, NLP-based, consumer-
oriented question answering systems. To
make these arguments more rigorous, it
would be valuable to develop quantitative
predictions of what the capabilities will be
of existing algorithms for computer algebra
and theorem proving when provided with
substantially expanded hardware resources.
For instance, we might examine problems in
mathematics or theoretical physics for which
naïve solutions in CASs are intractable with
current resources, but which may be feasible
with future hardware.
• The cognitive science of computer algebra:
What role has computer algebra played in
theoretical physics and mathematics? How
has it influenced the thinking process of
researchers? Has computer algebra simply
been a convenience that has shifted the way
problems are solved, or has it fundamentally
enabled new problems to be solved that would
have been completely intractable otherwise?
The cognitive science of mathematical thought
is a substantial topic which overlaps with
many established areas of research [66, 67, 68,
69, 70]. However, a systematic review of re-
search in mathematics and theoretical physics
since the advent of computer algebra and its
role in the mathematical thought process is an
underexplored topic. It would be an interest-
ing avenue to pursue in understanding the role
that CASs, ITPs, and integrated systems may
come to play in superintelligence, particularly
in the case of neuromorphic systems that have
been modeled after human cognition. These
questions also relate to understanding the scal-
ing properties of CAS and theorem proving
algorithms as well as cataloguing the most
widely used algorithms in computer algebra.
V. Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to examine pre-
existing research objectives in computer science
and related disciplines which align with problems
relevant to AI safety, thereby providing concrete,
practical context for problems which are otherwise
of a longer time horizon than most research. In par-
ticular, we focused on the notion of “Oracle AI” as
10
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used in the AI safety community, and observed that
the word oracle has two meanings in the context
of superintelligent AI systems. One usage refers
to a subsystem of a larger AI system queried for
domain-specific tasks, and the other to superintelli-
gent AI systems restricted to only answer questions.
We examined contemporary question answering
systems (QASs) and argued that due to their
architectural heterogeneity, consumer-oriented,
NLP-based systems do not readily lend themselves
to rigorous analysis from an AI safety perspective.
On the other hand, we identified computer algebra
systems as concrete, if primitive, examples of
domain-specific oracles. We examined well-known
architectural deficiencies with CASs identified
by the theorem proving community and argued
that the integration of interactive theorem provers
(ITPs) with CASs, an objective that has been an
area of research in the respective communities for
several decades, provides a set of research prob-
lems and practical software projects related to the
development of powerful and robust math oracles
on a multi-decade time horizon. Such systems
may also prove to be useful tools for AI safety
researchers in proving the functional correctness
of other components of an AI architecture. Natural
choices of systems to use would be interfaces for
the Wolfram Language, the most widely used
computer algebra system, with one of the HOL
family of theorem provers or Coq, both of which
have substantial repositories of formalized proofs
[71, 72, 73, 74], or a more modern ITP such as Lean
[75, 50].
In the context of superintelligent oracle AIs
which may possess the ability to manipulate a hu-
man user, we differentiate between addressing ar-
chitectural or algorithmic deficiencies in subsys-
tems versus general control methods or contain-
ment strategies. Given that strong mathematical
capabilities are likely to be useful in the construc-
tion of more general AI systems, designing robust
CASs (and any other domain-specific oracle) is an
important counterpart to general control strategies,
as the top-level AI system will have fewer loop-
holes to exploit. Controlling OAIs poses a distinct
set of challenges for which concrete mathematical
analysis is in its infancy [23, 8]. Nonetheless, con-
sidering how little attention has been given to the
superintelligence control problem in general, we
are optimistic about the potential to translate the
high-level analyses of OAIs that have arisen in the
AI safety community into the mathematical and
software frameworks of modern artificial intelli-
gence.
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